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REFORMING STANDARD-SETTING 
Giandomenico Majone 
Zentrum £fir i n t e r d i s z i p l i n 3 r e  Forschung 
U n i v e r s i t y  of  B i e l e f e l d ,  F e d e r a l  Republ ic  of  Germany 
1 .  Environmenta l ,  h e a l t h ,  and s a f e t y  s t a n d a r d s  a r e ,  and w i l l  l ong  
remain,  b a s i c  i n s t r u m e n t s  of r e g u l a t o r y  p o l i c y .  A t  t h e  same 
t i m e ,  t h e  s t a n d a r d - s e t t i n g  p r o c e s s  rests on p r e c a r i o u s  con- 
c e p t u a l ,  s c i e n t i f i c ,  and economic founda t i ons .  T h i s  c o n t r a -  
d i c t i o n  p o se s  d e l i c a t e  problems of  a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  r a t i o n a l i t y  
and p o l i t i c a l  l e g i t i m a c y .  For example, t h e  demand f o r  "con- 
c l u s i v e "  s c i e n t i f i c  ev idence  and thorough r i s k  a n a l y s e s  b e f o r e  
a  s t a n d a r d  i s  adopted ,  i s  more l i k e l y  t o  d e l a y  p u b l i c  a c t i o n  
t h a n  t o  improve t h e  q u a l i t y  o f  decis ion-making,  and t o  g e n e r a t e  
d i s s e n s i o n  r a t h e r  t h a n  consensus .  
What i s  needed i s  a  fundamental  r e s t r u c t u r i n g  of  pro-  
c e d u r e s ,  i n s t i t u t i o n s ,  and r e g u l a t o r y  p h i l o s o p h i e s  a l ong  l i n e s  
t h a t  e x p l i c i t l y  r e c o g n i z e  t h e  u n c e r t a i n t y  and complexi ty  o f  
r e g u l a t o r y  d e c i s i o n s .  Three d i r e c t i o n s  of r e g u l a t o r y  reform 
seem t o  be p a r t i c u l a r l y  impor tan t .  F i r s t ,  s t a t u t o r y  r egu l a -  
t i o n s  should  be r e p l a c e d  a s  much a s  p o s s i b l e  by n o n s t a t u t o r y  
codes  and s t a n d a r d s .  T h i s  i m p l i e s ,  among o t h e r  t h i n g s ,  a  nove l  
s t y l e  of  c o n s u l t a t i v e  r e g u l a t i o n  and i n s p e c t i o n  w i t h  p a r t i c i p -  
a t i v e  o v e r t o n e s .  
Second, a  d i s t i n c t i o n  should  be drawn between env i ron-  
menta l  and h e a l t h  g o a l s ,  on t h e  one hand, and c u r r e n t l y  f e a s i b l e  
l e v e l s  of p r o t e c t i o n ,  on t h e  o t h e r .  T h i s  d i s t i n c t i o n  i s  con- 
s i s t e n t  w i t h  t h e  p h i l o sophy  of W e s t  European and S o v i e t  regu- 
l a t o r s ,  and w i t h  t h e  a t t i t u d e s  of  many s c i e n t i s t s  i n  b o t h  
E a s t  and W e s t .  
* 
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Third, greater. attention should be paid to the 
procedural aspects of standard-setting. Given the level of 
cognitive complexity facing regulators, the substantive 
rationality of regulatory decisions cannot be judged inde- 
pendently of their procedural rationality. 
Concerning the first point -- the need for greater regula- 
tory flexibility -- it is clear that environmental, health, 
and safety standards should be revise2 as scientific know- 
ledge improves, empirical evidence acc~mulates, and socio- 
economic conditions and public perceptions change. However, 
frequent revisions are unlikely (or very costly) whea stand- 
ards are embedded in legal codes. Also, the more uncertain 
the scientific basis of regulation and the greater the need 
for flexibility and adaptability, the more discretion should 
be left to the regulatory agency. Eut statutory regulation 
sets narrow limits to administrative discretion. 
The experience of a number of European countriss 
shows that an effective regulatory system can be operated 
without heavy reliance on legizlly enforceable standards. 
In the Federal Republic of Germany end in France, naxim~n 
acceptable concentrations (FIACs) for toxic substances and 
other environmental limits are not embedded in legal codes 
but are used by the inspectors -- together with other in- 
formation about the physical, chemical, and toxicological 
characteristics of different substances -- for giving pre- 
ventive advice and monitoring working and environmental 
conditions. LWC values and standards are typically based on 
health criteria only. Guidelines interpreting the standards 
in the light of technical and economic constraints are 
issued by separate governmental co~missions, such as the 
Committee for Dangerous Materials in the Workplace set up 
bytheGerman Federal Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs. 
In the United Kingdom, too, occupa-t~ional health 
standards harre no spccific ie~al statl;s, but are used by 
thc Factory Insp-ctorate of the Departrl!?nt of Ei;lploymei?t 
for control 2nd surveillance c;f wor-ki!:y c~nditicns. A strong 
case for greater reliance on voluntary standards and codes 
is presented in the official report of the Parliamentary 
Committee appointed in May 1970 under the chairmanship of 
Lord Robens. ~lthough the report deals with occupational 
health and safety, many of its arguments have more wide- 
ranging validity. The following recormendations of the 
Robens Committee are particularly relevant to the present 
discussion: 
- Wherever practicable, regulations should be confined 
to statements of the broad objectives to be achieved. 
- In future, no statutory regulations should be made 
before detailed consideration has been given to whether 
objectives might adequately be met by a non-statutory 
standard or code of practice. 
- Greater emphasis should be placed on standard-setting 
by means of non-statutory codes and stand~rds. As a 
general rule, statutory regulations should only be made 
when the non-statutory alternatives have been fully 
explored and found wanting. 
- The whole regulatory system should be more flexible and 
more discriminating. Industry should be encouraged to 
deal with more of its own problems, thereby enabling 
official regulation to be more effectively concentrated 
on serious problems where strict official regulation is 
appropriate and necessary. 1) 
These recommendations express the belief that 
statutory regulations are largely ineffective, intrinsically 
rigid, and have a built-in tendency to become obsolete quite 
rapidly. On the other hand, "stand-ards and codes developed 
within industry and by independent bodies are, over a large 
part of the field, more practical and therefore potentially 
more effective instrdments of progress than statutory regu- 
lations. " * )  The Report concludes that what is needed. is 
"less law" and more provision for voluntary self-regulation 
at the plant level. 
However, i n  o r d e r  t c  p r o v i d e  c r e d i b l e  s a n c t i o n s  when 
needed,  i n s p e c t o r s  s h o u l d  have the power, w i t h o u t  r e f e r e n c e  
t o  t h e  c o u r t s ,  t o  i s s u e  fo rmal  Improvement N ~ t i c e s ,  i . e . ,  
o r d e r s  t o  comply n o t  o n l y  w i t h  any r e l e v a n t  s t a t u t o r y  regu-  
l a t i o n ,  b u t  a l s o  w i t h  any r e l e v a n t  v o l u n t a r y  code  o r  s t a n d -  
a r d  t h a t  h a s  been f o r m z l l y  approved by t h e  A u t h o r i t y  f o r  
S a f e t y  and H e a l t h  a t  Work. Volun ta ry  c c d e s  and s t a n d a r d s  
would a l s o  b e  a d m i s s i b l e  e v i d e n c e  i n  p r o c e e d i n g s  b e f o r e  
t r i b u n a l s .  I n  c a s e s  where s e r i o u s  h a z a r d s  o r  imminent d a n g e r s  
e x i s t ,  t h e  i n s p e c t o r  c o u l d  i s s u e  a  P r o h i b i t i o n  N o t i c e  o r d e r -  
i n g  t h a t ,  i n  t h e  e v e n t  of non-compliance w i t h i n  t h e  s t a t e d  
t i m e  l i m i t ,  t h e  u s e  of  s p e c i f i e d  p l a n t ,  mach ine ry ,  p r o c e s s e s  
o r  p r e m i s e s  must  b e  d i s c o n t i n u e d ,  o r  c o n t i n u e d  o n l y  under  
s p e c i f i c  c o n d i t i o n s .  
But e n s u r i n g  compl iance  w i t h  minimum l e g a l  r e q u i r e -  
ments  i s  n o t  t h e  main t a s k  of  t h e  i n s p e c t o r a t e .  R a t h e r ,  
i n s p e c t o r s  s h o u l d  b e  concerned w i t h  t h e  b road  z s p e c t s  of 
s a f e t y  and h e a l t h  a t  t h e  workp laces  t h e y  v i s i t ,  a s  nuch a s  
w i t h  t h o s e  narrow a s p e c t s  which may have  been t h e  s u b j e c t  
of d e t a i l e d s t a t u t o r y  r e g u l a t i o n s .  "We b e l i e v e , "  t h e  R e p o r t  
s t a t e s ,  " t h a t ,  a s  a  m a t t e r  o f  e x p l i c i t  p o l i c y ,  t h e  p r o v i s i o n  
o f  s k i l l e d  and i m p a r t i a l  a d v i c e  and a s s i s t a n c e  s h o u l d  be 
t h e  l e a d i n g  edge  o f  t h e  u n i f i e d  i n s p e c t o r a t e .  , I  3 1 
3 .  A second s u g g e s t i o n  f o r  r e g u l a t o r y  r e f o r m  i n v o l v e s  d r a x i n g  
a  d i s t i n c t i o n  between long-run g o a l s  and c u r r e n t l y  f e a s i b l e  
l e v e l s  of  p r o t e c t i o n .  Here t h e  approach  of  S o v i e t  r e g u l a t o r s  
i s  p a r t i c u l a r l y  i n s t r u c t i v e .  H e a l t h  s t a n d a r d s ,  S o v i e t  a u t h o r -  
i t i e s  m a i n t a i n ,  s h o u l d  be  based on h e a l t h  e f f e c t s  a l o n e ,  
w i t h o u t  r e g a r d  t o  t h e  a v a i l a b i l i t y  of a d e q u a t e  c o l l t r o l  
t e c h n o l o g y ,  t o  economic f e a s i b i l i t y ,  o r  even t o  t h e  a b i l i t v  
t o  a d e q u a t e l y  measure  t h e  c o n c e n t r a t i o n s  i n  p r a c t i c e .  A 
c u r r e n t l y  u n a t t a i n a b l e  s t a n d a r d  can s t i l l  r e p r e s e n t  a g u i d e -  
l i n e  f o r  en fo rcement  and an  i n c e n t i v e  f o r  f u t u r e  r e s e a r c h  
i n  c o n t r o l  t e c h n o l o g y .  Converse ly ,  s i n c e  t e c h n i c a l l - y  o r  
e c o n o m i c a l l y  a t t a i n a b l e  CGnCe3t . r2 t ion~ w i l l  c o i n c i d e  w i t h  
h a r m l e s s  c o n c e n t r a t i o n s  o n l y  by chance ,  s t a n d a r d s  based on 
considerations of economic or technical feasibility "can 
act only as an obstacle to the search for better techniques, 
... they sanction what has already been achieved without 
stimulating new technical zdvances. I# 4 ) 
Since "scientifically based" standards cannot always 
be achieved, the Soviets a l s ~  use secondary stzndards that 
may modify, for a limited period of time, the requirements 
set by the primary standards. During this time, the situa- 
tion must be brought into conformity with the.primary stznd- 
ards. It is claimed that if this approach is adopted, health 
standards will not be used to sanction existing technical 
and economic conditions, but will faithfully represent health 
policy goals. 
It is not easy to determine the extent to which this 
regulatory philosophy is actually translated into practice; 
opinions among western experts differ. However, the criti- 
cism that standards used in the West tend to codify existing 
economic and technical conditions, to the detriment of their 
normativecharacter, has some validity. It is often said 
that one of the main goals of environmental and health stand- 
ards is to channel growth away from hazardous industries 
and materials toward safer forms of production and employ- 
ment. But it is hard to see how a "feasible" stangard (in the 
sense in which this term has been recently use6 i~ the United 
States) can provide the necessary signals. 
American regulators are constantly urqed to treat 
economic and technical feasibility as important considerations 
in the derivation of standards. Responding to these pressures, 
regulators tend increasingly to conflate the conceptually 
distinct stages of standard-setting (setting long-run goalsj 
and standard-using (achieving currently feasible levels of 
protection). The resulting aggregation of scientific, tech- 
nical, economic, and political criteria is not only ad hoc, 
but also logically inscrutable. As a consequelice, the meaning 
of the numerical value chosen for a gi-\.en standard is arnbig- 
uous, representing neither a policy goal, nor a scientific 
judgment o f  h e a l t h  r i s k ,  nor even ( i n  t h e  c a s e  o f  n a t i o n a l  
s t a n d a r d s )  a  measure of  t h e  l e v e l  of  p r o t e c t i o n  t h a t  can 
b e  r e a s o n a b l y  ach ieved  i n  s p e c i f i c  l o c a l  s i t u a t i o n s .  
4 .  Taken t o g e t h e r ,  t h e  two s u g g e s t i o n s  d i s c u s s e d  s o  f a r  i n p l y  
a  r eg ,u l a to ry  model t h a t  rel ies less on law and more on 
s e l f - r eguT ,a t i on ,  v o l u n t a r y  compl iance ,  and a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  
d i s c r e t i o n  i n  t e c h n i c a l  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s .  What are t h e  func- 
t i o n a l  r e q u i s i t e s  f o r  a  v i a b l e  system of  t h i s  k ind?  The 
fol lowing c o n d i t i o n s  seem t o  be  e s s e n t i a l :  ( 1 )  a  c r i t i c a l  
m a s s  of  h i g h l y  q u a l i f i e d  and i n c o r r u p t i b l e  i n s p e c t o r s ;  
( 2 )  a p o l i t i c a l  c u l t u r e  p r e d i s p o s i n g  people  t o  a c c e p t  a 
c o n s i d e r a b l e  amount of  a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  d i s c r e t i c n ;  ( 3 )  t h e  
a v a i l a b i l i t y  o f  s i g n i f i c a n t  p e n a l t i e s  f o r  s e r i o u s  v i o l a t i o n s ;  
and ( 4 )  an  a c t i v e  concern  on t h e  p a r t  of  workers ,  rna~agemezt ,  
and c i t i z e n s  a t  l a r g e  f o r  t h e  q u a l i t y  of  t h e  arr,bient and 
workplace  environment .  
I n  a number of  c o u n t r i e s  of  Western Europe,  t h e s e  
c o n d i t i o n s  are a t  l e a s t  approx imate ly  s a t i s f i e d .  However, 
many American a n a l y s t s  doubt  t h a t  a  sys tem of s e l f - r e g u l a -  
t i o n  and f l e x i b l e  i n s p e c t i o n  w i t h  p a r t i c i p a t i v e  and a d v i s o r y  
c v e r t o n e s  would work i n  t h e  United S t a t e s .  American i n spec -  
t o r s  do  n o t  s h a r e  t h e  p r e s t i g e  and long  t r a d i t i o n  of t h e i r  
European c o l l e a g u e s ,  and a l s o  t h e i r  t r a i n i n g  i s  a p p a r e n t l y  
n o t  as good. The pre-OSHA expe r i ence  w i t h  "consensus  s t a n d -  
a r d s "  v o l u n t a r i l y  adopted by i n d u s t r y  under l a x  s u p e r v i s i o n  
by t h e  s t a t e s  ha s  been s h a r p l y  c r i t i c i z e d  by l a b o r  un ions  
and p u b l i c  i n t e r e s t  g roups .  Above a l l ,  t h e  Arnerican p o l i t y  
i s  v e r y  r e l u c t a n t  t o  p l a c e  d i s c r e t i o n  i n  t h e  hands of  i t s  
p u b i i c  s e r v a n t s .  The whole r e g u l a t o r y  s t r u c t u r e ,  an i n s i g h t -  
f u l  r e f e r r e e  h a s  p o i n t e d  o u t  t o  m e ,  i s  se t  up t o  p r o t e c t  
t h e  r i g h t s  of  t h e  r e g u l a t e d  f r o n  " a r b i t r a r y "  s h i f t s  i n  
p o s i t i o n  on t h e  p a r t  of  t h e  a d m i n i s t r a t o r s .  
C l e a r l y ,  any major reform of t h e  p r e s e n t  sys tem 
r a i s e s  s e r i o u s  q u e s t i o n s  of  p o l i t . i c a 1  f e a s i b i l i t y .  A 
thorough f e a s i b i l i t y  a n a l y s i s  i s  o u t s i d e  t h e  scGpe of t h i s  
n o t e ,  bu t  I s h a l l  t r y  t o  i n d i c a t e  some of t h e  c o s t s  o f  t h e  
institutional constraints under which the American system 
operates. 
Mandatory standards focus the attention of operators 
and inspectors on a small set of permissible values and 
approved practices, at the expense of more comprehensive 
assessments of the overall quaiity of ambient or workplace 
environment. The logic of statutory control is such that 
it is difficult to differentiate between the important and 
.the trivial, between form and substance. With no formal 
place for discretion in technical interpretations, the 
situation beco~nes one of either compliance or breach. 
Moreover, given the limited knowledge available today 
in toxicology, radiation biology, epidemiology, and related 
fields, the numerical precision of current standards is 
spurious. At the same time, rigid statutory control does not 
allow the frequent revisions that a steady flow of new evi- 
dence would require. Nor can general regulations be written 
with enough specificity to accommodate all the unique con- 
ditions encountered in the millions of workplac~s and thoa- 
sands of communities of a large industrialized country. In 
fact, each major risk or health problem represents, in some 
sense, an exception; and we know that where an organization 
faces many exceptions and lacks a reliable body of knowledge 
from which solutions can be unambiguously derived, institu- 
tional arrangements approximating a professional model 
(equalitarian, flexible, allowing discretion) are more ap- 
propriate than the routinized, hierarchical patterns of 
bureaucracy. 5 
The third direction of reform is concerned with what Berbert 
Simon has called "procedural rationality". In situatioLs 
charac-kerized by great uncertainty and cognitive complexity, 
Simon argues, "we must give zn account not only of substantive 
rationality -- the extent to which appropriate courses of 
action are chosen -- hut also of procedural rationality -- 
the effzctivencss, in light of human cognitive powers and 
limitations, of th2 procedures used to choose actions. I 1  6 1 
Policy analysis h?s bezn traditionally concerned 
with the problem of choosing the best means to achieve 
given ends. The basic conceptual categories of the palicy 
analyst -- goals, alternatives, impacts, effectiveness, 
choice -- clearly reveal his deep commitment to a teleolog- 
ical conception of policy making. According to this con- 
ception, rationality means maximizing something; it means 
choosing the best alternative, subject to a set of con- 
straints. Hence the preoccupation with methods of analysis 
and evaluation that emphasize outcome rather than process, 
and the interest in what decisi.ons are made, rather than 
in how they are aade. As a result, policy analysis lacks 
the methodological eq~ivaler~ts of legal. notions like rea- 
soned decision, proper form, and rules cf evidence. 
This indifference toward procedures and the for;r.al 
layout of arguments is justifiable under the assumption 
that there is "one best way" of making a decision cr, if 
several methods are possible, that there is a well-defined 
rule for choosing among them. This is certainly not the 
situation in standard-setting. Here, Jerome Cornfield points 
out, "[all1 present safety evaluation procedures ... must 
be regarded as mathematical formalisms whose correspondence 
with the realities of low dose effects is, and may lzng 
remain, largely conjectural. "'I Thus, the mcst important 
problem is not determining the "correct" value for a certain 
standard -- is it 5 or 2 ppm? -- but which criteria and 
procedures shou1.d be used to choose among competing models, 
approaches, and regulatery philosophies. 
In other i.iords, the main problem with many environ- 
mental policy decisions is not that they are, in some sense, 
suboptimal (we generally lack the scientific and medical 
knowledge to kne;.~ what the corzect decisioil should be), but 
that they leave auch to be desired in terms of procedural 
rationality. S-tandard-settzrs often fail to probe Z e e ~ l y  
into the quality of the avzil?.blu2 evi$.c;-,ce, or to test the 
sensitivity of thz chosen m d e i  to uncertainty and alter- 
native assurn2t.ions. Even morn commc~nly , the ncthodolcgy 
used in reasoning from the data to a proposed standard is 
so informal that it is impossible to retrace the steps of 
the agency's argument and its factual basis. Again, the 
standard-setting process usually does not include any pro- 
cedures specifically designed to bring out unstated assump- 
tions, differing interpretations, and gaps in logic or in 
the empirical evidence. 
An interesting example of procedural reform in the 
area of environmental regulation comes from the United 
States. Here the courts have developed "paper hearing" pro- 
cedures that combine many of the advantages of a trial- 
type adversary process (without oral testimony and cross- 
examination), while avoiding undue costs and delays in de- 
cision-making . 8, Although procedural requirements are not 
by themselves sufficient to overcome the rigidity of the 
present system and its built-in tendency to become obsolete, 
they seem to have been fairly successful in improving the 
technical quality of environmental decision making. Data 
and technical studies are collected and organized more 
systematically; external criticism is explicitly taken into 
account so that policies reflect a broader range of consider- 
ations and interests; the various subunits of the regulatory 
agency are motivated to coordinate their assessments, 
methodologies, and conclusions. The new procedures should 
also increase the influence of the people who, because of 
their special knowledge, are more directly involved in 
standard-setting. 
I would argue that the experience of the "paper 
hearing" procedures developed at EPA under the Clean Air 
Act has general relevance. The requirement of an open record 
that includes the factual and methodological bases of an 
agency' s conclusions, as vie11 as external criticisru and 
rssponses to such criticism, is always a powerful incentive 
Lo more careful agency deliberations. The need to improve 
the intellectual quality of ~dministrative deliberatinns 
is not, however, the only reason why procedural questions 
are so important. today. In situati.ons of great compl-exi-ty 
and cognitive uncertainty it is essential that the groups 
affected should be willing to accept the outcome of the 
administrative process even before this has been determined. 
By ensurincj adequate representation of conflicting opinions 
and examining a wide range of alternatives, well-designed 
procedures can greatly improve not only the rationality but 
also the legitimacy of regclatory decisions. 
Notes 
Safety and Health at Work, Report of the Committee, 
1970-1972, Chairman Lord Robens, London: H.M. Stationery 
Office, Cm. 5034, 1972, pp. 44-46. 
Ib., p. 48. 
Ib. p* 65. 
V.A. Rjazanov, "Criteria and methods for establishing 
maximum permissible concentrations of air pollution", 
Bulletin of the World Health Organization, vol. 32, 
1965, p. 390. 
Charles Perrow, "A framework for the comparative analysis 
of organizations", American Sociological Review, vol. 32, 
1967, pp. 194-208; J. Kenneth Benson, "The analysis of 
bureaucratic-professional conflict: function~l versus 
dialectic approaches", The Sociological Quarterly, vol. 14, 
1973, pp. 376-394. 
Herber-t A. Simon, "Rationality as process and as product 
of thought", American Economic Association Proceedi~gs, - 
vol. 68, May 1978, p. 90 (Simon's italics). 
Jerome Cornfield, "Carcinogenic risk assessment", Science, 
vol. 198, 18 November 1977, p. 698. 
W.F. Pedersen, Jr., "Formal records and informal rule 
making", Yale Law Journal, vol. 85, 1975, pp. 38-88. 
